Tilting At Windmills and Puncturing That Lousy Giant

Triune Brain
To live is to desire. This burning desire originates from the interaction of seven internal loops (three loops in hardware for performance, one loop in firmware for stability and plasticity, and three loops in software for maximum flexibility) with the unfolding external environment:
- Reptilian loop
- Mammalian loop
- Hominid loop
- Cultural loop
- Political loop
- Strategic loop
- Operational loop
- Tactical loop
Hardware
Firmware
Software
The most fundamental desires emerge from deep in the brain. They rise through the cultural loop, where they are prioritized and on to the political loop to receive their division of power. The strategic loop follows and the desires are reconciled with power. Then the desires and their allotted power is arranged in space and time until, finally desire and power directly interact with the outside environment through the tactical loop.
Desire faces a uncertain environment. It may encounter friends and if may encounter enemies. It may only encounter indifference. At minimum, fulfilling a desire faces two obstacles: friction, the inanimate factors that cumulatively add up to make things difficult, and opposition, living competitors that react when acted upon. Together friction and opposition create a byzantine maze of barriers that stand between a desire and its realization. The only escape from frustrated desire is through adaption and control.

OODA Loop
Adaption follows John Boyd’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop. The first step is observing the environment. Observation takes a snapshot of a slice of the universe. This Observation is forwarded on to the Orientation stage. Orientation is the most important stage in the adaption process because it is where compression occurs.
To learn is to compress. The universe is vast. The mind is not. Yet, to adapt to the universe, the mind must fit it inside the mind. Through the process of Orientation, some bits of the universe are selected and other bits are discarded. This process follows a progression from analysis/deduction to synthesis/induction. First the original Observation is analyzed by breaking it into smaller, more easily processed chunks through a process of deduction which starts from the Observation’s surface and works inwards. Then the Observation is synthesized by reassembling it into a new, compressed, and possibly more relevant pattern through a process of induction which starts from inside the analyzed Observation and works outwards. Some analytic/deductive and synthetic/inductive criteria is determined in software, some in firmware, and some is hardwired into hardware. The deeper in the mind you go, the more Observed information is thrown away in analysis, the tighter the compression produced by synthesis becomes, and the more reliance is placed on compression shortcuts like heuristics and archetypes. For example, reptilian loop compression is tighter than tactical loop compression. The closer you get to the reptilian core, the more the world is reduced to stark blacks and whites.
The end product of Orientation is a hypothesis, a synthesized compression of the original Observation that offers a prediction of what the future holds. This hypothesis is subjected to testing either through immediate Action or by being forwarded to the Decision stage for further deliberation. If the hypothesis and the Action it produces are correct, the success will be Observed and the OODA loop will repeat. If it’s incorrect, assuming the mind taking the action isn’t killed as a result of their mistake, the unsuccessful result will still be Observed. Both mistakes and successes contribute to learning. If a hypothesis is correct and the results are stored for future recollection, adaption has been achieved. If a hypothesis is incorrect or the results of previous OODA loops are discarded, adaption has failed.
Adaption is largely a defensive reaction to the environment. Control, however, is an offensive imposition on the outside environment. Control takes the synthesized compression stored inside the mind and attempts to impose it on the outside world. Instead of synchronizing the mind with the outside environment, control is intended to synchronize the outside environment to the imprint of the mind. This is usually not a total imposition of control on the outside environment but “some selected degree of control”, as Wylie commented. The selected degree of control is determined by the nature of desire, the mind’s “own purpose”.
Desire is what drives any and all attempts to impose control on the external environment. Control’s mission is to make the world save for desire. To do this, it seeks to make the outside world conform to its internal hypothesis. Since a hypothesis is a prediction, control above all seeks to make the outside world predictable. Reality inside the mind is predictable. It’s the rudeness of outside interruptions that keeps introducing unpredictability. Some of this can be dealt with adaption. However, that may only achieve mere survival. Control holds within itself the possibility of achieving all the desires of the heart. But any selected degree of control can only be achieved through the accumulation of power.
Control Loop
The process of applying control runs through a control loop, the very same OODA loop as adaption uses. The progress of the control loop regulates power as it runs through the PAR loop:
- Potential: power that has not been used.
- Application: power that is in the process of being used through conversion from one form of power to another.
- Realization: the impact of the use of power.
Progress through Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action regulates progress through Potential, Application, and Realization. The reference point by which progress is gauged is desire. However, this gauging of progress is complex. This complexity comes from the multitude of control loops guiding the consumption of power towards the realization of desire. There are seven control loops, the same seven loops introduced earlier. Each of these loops serve different functions and move at different speeds. In the loops of the software layer, adaption can be quite brisk. In the firmware layer, adaption is somewhat slower and more plastic. In the hardware layer, adaption can take centuries to eons to change. For example, tactical loop adaption is fast while reptilian loop adaption is slow. One is adaption entirely in software. The other is adaption in hardware. One is shaped by conscious design. The other is shaped (at least up to this point) solely by biological circumstance.
In some ways humans are profoundly unprepared for the modern world. Their most primeval loops are optimized for a hunter-gatherer lifestyle where the world is populated by hostile predators, especially other humans. Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that the compression the human mind utilizes is optimized for a predictable range of eventualities. His example is that of seeing a leopard. Seeing a leopard, the danger centers of the reptilian and mammalian brains kick in and you turn and run. This is a response with a fair degree of success and was rewarded by natural selection. A species of people running from leopards was created and filled the earth. However, the same instincts fail in stock trading. If you see a crash, you’re tempted to run from it. The modern world is filled with ambiguities the hardware of the human mind is unprepared for, though seeing a banker bearing derivatives is good reason to turn and run.

Pareto distribution
The worse thing that the mind is unprepared for is the black swan. A black swan has a profound impact, it is unexpected, and all you can do afterward is moralize it. The OODA loop could accurately be called the Observe-Moralize-Decide-Act loop. This is because the black swan, with its occurrence in fat tails, tempts the mind to beat a Pareto curve into a Bell curve.

Bell Curve
This is the realist dilemma: when all you see is bell curves, everything is a bell curve. Imagine yourself an Eastern Roman or Sassanid IR scholar. 700 years of incremental warfare has presented you with a stable international regime where parts of Armenia and Syria might change hands several times every 100 years. You would expect both regimes to endure since they’ve both been around for 700 years. Both are relatively politically stable and have seen many a crisis and endured them just fine. Based on the bell curve, you would be right. Unfortunately, you would be wrong.
The realist is baffled by the black swan. He, following the logic of control, seeks predictability by imposing his well-worn compression on a world. Sometimes the world will be compliant. Sometimes, however, it will black swan. Some desert dwelling nomads of no consequence will pour out of the Arabian wastes, inspired by an idea. The Byzantines were driven beyond the Taurus mountains and pressed within an inch of their lives. The Sassanid state was destroyed and its religion and political order destroyed. The IR scholar would be found in a wasted city or in a refugee column. Perhaps a passerby would be kind and listen to his wailing over the destruction of his theories of equilibrium. All should mourn with the IR scholar. Theirs is the lot of modern man, the ever more frequent victim of the black swan and his own slow control loops.
The Islamic universalist tide, instantiated in jihad, continued to sweep the world. More worldly men would attempt to buy it off or make peace with it but that was only a temporary respite if there was any at all. Islam was quite entrepreneurial. Since every Muslim was under the command to spread the faith, every local ghazi or khan could launch his own local offensive against his infidel neighbor. A Shadow of God on Earth such as Suleiman the Magnificent was perfectly happy to strike a realist alliance with a naive infidel like Francis I of France. If the infidels in the House of War were fighting each other, it just made the job of the Faithful that much easier.
Islam did encounter counter-movements. Some of these succeeded. Some failed. The Crusades failed to win permanent Christian possession of the Holy Land but it did regain Portugal and Spain, nations built upon a universalist ideal that carried them around the African coastline in search for Prester John as an ally against the Muslim tide and across the New World in search of souls, among other commodities. While faith did not reclaim the Holy Land for the Christians, it did regain the Holy Land for the Muslims. Call it the Last Crusade, if jihad can be called a crusade. About the point when Islam was reaching its extremes under the Moguls and the Ottomans at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a new Islam was rising on the Atlantic seaboard of the North American continent. This tide would eventually destroy the old empires of Eurasia and aggressively provide a model that was so pervasive that modern tyranny would parrot its forms as the tribute vice gave to virtue. But that’s a story for another time.


1 – “This is the realist dilemma: when all you see is bell curves, everything is a bell curve.”
Not so. As I have countered before, no one is free of ideals.
2 – “Imagine yourself an Eastern Roman or Sassanid IR scholar. 700 years of incremental warfare has presented you with a stable international regime where parts of Armenia and Syria might change hands several times every 100 years. You would expect both regimes to endure since they’ve both been around for 7oo years.”
I don’t see why, since other long lasting empires – Egypt, Rome etc – were also gone by that time.
3 – “The realist is baffled by the black swan. He, following the logic of control, seeks predictability by imposing his well-worn compression on a world. Sometimes the world will be compliant. Sometimes, however, it will black swan.”
If there was a perfect formula for international events prediction, one wouldn’t need competing schools of thought …
As often as Realists may be wrong however, does not mean any other school is better. Namely because all idealist schools are both temporary and exceptionalist by definition…
4 – “Some desert dwelling nomads of no consequence will pour out of the Arabian wastes, inspired by an idea. The Byzantines were driven beyond the Taurus mountains and pressed within an inch of their lives. The Sassanid state was destroyed and its religion and political order destroyed.”
For the student of the fall of Rome or that of the Seleucids, those events might not be that surprising.
In any event, the argument has no basis given that exceptionalist idealists would have been even less successful in deserting their prejudices.
If the Realist scholar is baffled by the black swan, the idealist prefers to see it in white…
5 – “The Islamic universalist tide.”
Universalism can be successful, it is just not long lasting. No one ever said Egypt could not fall to Islam, but it would have been most unlikely for Damascus’ or Bagdad’s rule over the people of the Nile to persist…
Moreover, a universalist doctrine without a consolidated statehood or national project behind it is always fragile at best, as the Umayyads’ scarce century of dominance proves.
6 – “The Crusades failed to win permanent Christian possession of the Holy Land but it did regain Portugal and Spain.”
Unsubstantiated. Portugal fought Castile with Granada and all the iberian kingdoms were developing national polities based on ethnic differences. The Kingdom of Jerusalem on the other hand was a multinational project whose central authority was endemically undermined.
It was not the crusades that defeated Islam in the westernmost peninsula, it was geography and lack of national legitimacy.
One could also demonstrate how successful the “crusades” were against eastern pagans in Finland and Prussia but the fact remains that religion had very little to do with it.
7 – “Portugal and Spain, nations built upon a universalist ideal that carried them”
Universalist ideal yes. But if the universalist ideal made the difference in the success of the latin empires, it was for the worse: “Christians and Pepper” was the motto, but it was evangelism that prevented Portugal from securing a monopoly on trade with China and that got them expelled from Japan.
While the Christian legacy endured in India, had it not been for the precedence of spice trade over evangelisation, an alliance of Christians and Hindus against Muslim interests would never have been possible.
M. N. Silva
August 4, 2009 at 9:21 AM
“Not so. As I have countered before, no one is free of ideals.”
I have no doubt that realists have ideals. I doubt, however, that they have realism.
“I don’t see why, since other long lasting empires – Egypt, Rome etc – were also gone by that time.”
Given that Byzantium and Persian were both militarily vigorous in 632 and the Arabs had been feeble pawns of both empires, I’d bet on surprise.
“If there was a perfect formula for international events prediction, one wouldn’t need competing schools of thought … As often as Realists may be wrong however, does not mean any other school is better. Namely because all idealist schools are both temporary and exceptionalist by definition…”
It’s not a matter of prediction. It’s a matter of folkways that provide resilience when the inevitable nasty surprise occurs. Such folkways always have a bit of the accidental, the ad hoc, the redundant, and the irrational about them. They don’t predict or anticipate. They comfort.
“For the student of the fall of Rome or that of the Seleucids, those events might not be that surprising.”
That assumes that our seventh century IR scholar would compare his relatively vigorous society to the whimper of Seleucid Syria and the shadow of the Western Empire instead of a more vigorous model.
“In any event, the argument has no basis given that exceptionalist idealists would have been even less successful in deserting their prejudices.”
I don’t think it’s a matter of deserting prejudices. It’s a matter of having the right prejudices. No one, idealist realist or realist idealist, has a monopoly on the right prejudices.
“If the Realist scholar is baffled by the black swan, the idealist prefers to see it in white…”
All black swans are white swans in retrospect. That’s what makes them black swans.
“Universalism can be successful, it is just not long lasting. No one ever said Egypt could not fall to Islam, but it would have been most unlikely for Damascus’ or Bagdad’s rule over the people of the Nile to persist…Moreover, a universalist doctrine without a consolidated statehood or national project behind it is always fragile at best, as the Umayyads’ scarce century of dominance proves.”
One problem with realism is that it automatically equates success with political success. Even worse, it may equate success with immediate political success (if a century can be dismissed as an immediate political outcome). Politics is a cultural instrument, not an end in itself. Culture, especially one with universalist aspirations, uses states as instruments to propagate itself. The Islamic project is served whether it’s political manifestation is Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Ottoman, Saudi, or other transitory political community. Mecca and Medina do not exercise political control over Cairo, Damascus, or Baghdad. Their control is a more enduring rule.
“Unsubstantiated. Portugal fought Castile with Granada and all the iberian kingdoms were developing national polities based on ethnic differences. The Kingdom of Jerusalem on the other hand was a multinational project whose central authority was endemically undermined.”
Why didn’t the same logic sweep away the Hapsburg Empire in 100 years? Or sweep away the Russian empire in 100 years? Why raise the Crusades as a epochal example of the failure of universalist idealism while failing to acknowledge that the jihad that swept the Crusaders back into the sea was an epochal example of the success of universalist idealism?
“It was not the crusades that defeated Islam in the westernmost peninsula, it was geography and lack of national legitimacy.”
Odd how “geography” and “lack of national legitimacy” didn’t drive Rome from Spain. Or Christianity from Spain. Or Islam from Indonesia. Or Islam from Afghanistan. And on and on.
“One could also demonstrate how successful the “crusades” were against eastern pagans in Finland and Prussia but the fact remains that religion had very little to do with it.”
I find the modern’s tendency to underestimate the religiosity of medieval man to be amusing. It’s true that material motivations went hand and hand with the Teutonic Knights but to suggest that religion was just window dressing is naive.
“Universalist ideal yes. But if the universalist ideal made the difference in the success of the latin empires, it was for the worse: “Christians and Pepper” was the motto, but it was evangelism that prevented Portugal from securing a monopoly on trade with China and that got them expelled from Japan.
While the Christian legacy endured in India, had it not been for the precedence of spice trade over evangelisation, an alliance of Christians and Hindus against Muslim interests would never have been possible.”
That assumes that profits are a more important harvest than souls and that power is more important than the ends that power serves. Realism is focused on means, not ends, and on the now rather than the depths of time. That’s why realism is a tactical mindset, not a strategic mindset.
josephfouche
August 4, 2009 at 8:03 PM